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The Honduran Question: The U.S.
Answer to Latin America
Lindsay Young *

ABSTRACT
Honduras grabbed international headlines when the Honduran Military
removed José Manuel Zelaya Rosales from power on June 28, 2009. This
paper uses the instability in Honduras as a case study of how the United
States should respond to threats to democracy, and approach questions of
democratic legitimacy in Latin America. It will first evaluate democratic
contentions to put the Honduran crisis into a broader historical context.
Next, it will examine the legality of the actions that triggered the democratic
crisis because, though legality is not sufficient for legitimacy, it should be an
important consideration in determining foreign policy responses. It will
discuss the choices that the United States had between the removal of
President Zelaya and the election of his successor, and analyze the path that
the United States ultimately chose by supporting the reinstatement of
President Zelaya, until it was clear that the reinstatement would not occur, at
which point it decided to support the November election.
I. INTRODUCTION
Latin America presents a distinct challenge to U.S. foreign policy. The
region is highly democratic, but many of the countries have not consolidated
their democracies. In the fall of 2009, the turmoil in Honduras was
President Obama’s first test on how to approach the development of
democracy in Latin America and illustrates the concerns regarding the
internal struggles of democracy and the limited options that the U.S. has in
another country’s internal affairs. This paper uses the instability in
Honduras as a case study of how the United States should respond to threats
to democracy in Latin America and approach the question of democratic
legitimacy in Latin America.
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The Honduran military removed President Zelaya from power on June
28, 2009 because of President Zelaya’s attempts to pursue a national
referendum that would allow presidential reelection. The Honduran
Constitution allows for a presidential veto or decree to alter the Honduran
Constitution except in cases that relate to the “conduct of the executive
branch.” A national vote initiated by the president may sound democratic,
but the single term provision in the constitution remedied the political
structure that had led to years of military dictatorship.
The legislative and the judicial branches of Honduras see President
Zelaya’s dismissal as an act to safeguard democracy because Article 239 of
the Honduran Constitution states that if someone tries to extend term limits,
that person is to be immediately removed and disqualified from holding
executive office for ten years. 1 President Zelaya tried to work around this
restriction by framing his referendum in terms of a broad constitutional
reform, but his policies limited democracy by expanding the power of the
executive, and ultimately followed the trajectory of Hugo Chávez. 2
After President Zelaya’s seizure and deportation, Honduras scheduled
an emergency election for November 29, 2009, and the opposition candidate,
Porfirio Lobo, won the election. Prior to the election, the U.S. did not
support President Zelaya’s removal, but the U.S. is now supporting the 2009
election in an effort to promote national reconciliation and democracy. 3
President Zelaya is still living in exile as a civilian in the Dominican
Republic. 4 The U.S. is suffering moderate political backlash because not all
countries are recognizing the election as legitimate. 5 For example, countries
such as Brazil are considering this move tantamount to supporting a coup. 6
In addition, Freedom House, a non-governmental organization that publishes
an annual ranking of countries based on their relative levels of democratic
freedom, has relegated Honduras’s status and no longer classifies Honduras
as an electoral democracy. 7
The U.S. response to the removal of President Zelaya sets a precedent
for democracy and stability in the region. With this in mind, the U.S. had to
evaluate its options and ascertain which choice will best promote democracy
and stability, and minimize the political consequences to the U.S. In the
case of Honduras, the U.S. could have supported, ignored, or denounced the
removal of President Zelaya, since the use of force would have been
inappropriate. The U.S. made the right choice by moderately supporting
President Zelaya’s reinstatement, and then accepting the results of the next
election as legitimate. 8 Ultimately, the U.S. should choose to recognize free
and fair elections in the case of Honduras or any Latin American country
that might be in a similar situation in the future because the U.S. must
demonstrate strong support for democracy to assist in Latin America’s
struggle to overcome history.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first step to evaluating the U.S.’s policy response in Honduras is to
put the crisis into a broader historical context. In the case of Honduras, it
declared independence from Spain on September 15, 1821. 9
The
government began as a series of caudillos, political factions, and the military
evolved from arming these political factions. 10 Tiburcio Carías Andino,
who ruled from 1933 to 1948, created the first professionalized army, but it
was not until 1954, that Juan Manuel Galvez strengthened the military
relationship between the U.S. and Honduras. 11 In 1954, the Honduran
Congress prevented the democratically elected president from assuming
power and Vice-President Julio Lozano took control. 12
When the civilian government tried to limit the power of the military
that had been entrenched in Honduran institutions by earlier military control,
there was a military coup. 13 From 1963–1971, General Oswaldo López
Arellano ruled Honduras, however, his government’s credibility diminished
when it lost a border dispute with El Salvador. 14 Consequently, a weak
civilian government briefly took control before López seized power again. 15
In 1975 the military seized power from Lopez and gave control to the
more militaristic control by Colonel Juan Melgar. 16 Colonel Policarpo Paz
García then deposed Melagar in 1978. Paz Garcia promised to return the
country to civilian rule, though he remained as president of the interim
government created following the election of a new assembly government. 17
The military retained considerable control over civilian government until
1982, when democracy was restored under Roberto Suazo Córdova. 18
Under the “protected democracy” of the 1980s, the military retained
considerable power and benefited from U.S. military aid in response to the
Contras of El Salvador. 19 The U.S. established bases to train and deploy
Contras against the Sandinista government. 20
Following the Cold War, the U.S. became critical of the Honduran
military and cut military aid and Honduras now ranks 154th in percent of
GDP used for military forces. 21 In addition, the International Court of
Justice ended the border dispute between Honduras and El Salvador. 22 The
Honduran people, sick of corruption and the economic burden of the
military, created a movement to demilitarize the government and society
through major military cutbacks. 23 Civilian leaders have greater control of
the government, but it is nevertheless still important to consider how
frequently military control has usurped civilian control in recent history.
Understanding the repeated intervention of the military and the U.S. support
for Honduras’ military dictatorships of the past brings to light why the U.S.
response to military involvement in President Zelaya’s removal is important.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Interpreting the legality of any democratic crisis can provide insight in
to what kind of predicament the country is in. If those in power have clearly
acted illegally, it would be hard to imagine a scenario where these actors
acted in the interest of democracy. On the other hand, there may be legal
ways to subjugate democracy and such actions should not be encouraged.
Legality is not sufficient for legitimacy, but it should be an important
consideration in determining which actions the U.S. should support, ignore,
or sanction.
The Honduran Constitution, which has been continuously revised, is the
source of confusion in defining the legality of the Honduran action to
remove President Zelaya. The Honduran Constitution’s impeachment clause
was removed by decree. 24 In addition, while the Honduran Constitution
allows for charges to be filed against high officials, it lacks a provision
explaining the procedure of removal. 25 Even when there are relevant
provisions, there are disagreements about their interpretation. 26 The main
points of contention are whether the Honduran government could still pursue
impeachment after the clause had been taken out by decree, whether the
Supreme Court has the authority to try the President’s removal, whether the
Supreme Court could use the military to remove President Zelaya, whether
the military acted in accordance with the warrant issued by the Supreme
Court under the Honduran Constitution, and whether such violations would
make the entire action unconstitutional. 27
Because the impeachment clause, Article 205, Section 15, was repealed
in 2003 by Decree 157/2003, the procedure of impeachment by the
legislature was also repealed. 28 President Zelaya’s removal was based on
the Supreme Court’s ability to try high officials in Article 313, Section 2,
which was established in the same year in Decree 175/2003. 29 Because both
provisions were decreed in the same year, one can conclude the intent of the
decrees was to replace the legislative impeachment clause with judicial
action. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s trial of President Zelaya seems to
comply with constitutional requirements. In rulings made on May 27, 2009
and May 29, 2009, the Supreme Court declared that the president could not
change the constitutional provision against reelection by a referendum, a
poll, or any other method that violates the clauses prohibiting reelection in
Article 218, Section 9. 30 Therefore, President Zelaya’s trial produced a clear
prohibition against the President’s actions to alter the Honduran Constitution
to make him eligible for reelection.
However, the trial presents complications because there is no provision
in the constitution explaining how the trial procedure works and specifically,
there are no provisions that outline the role of the military or police forces in
enforcing the court’s ruling. It was not the decision to remove President
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Zelaya that caused the most uproar but rather, the means of removal that
garnered the greatest objections. The involvement of armed forces in
President Zelaya’s removal caused the most controversy, second only to the
outcry against President Roberto Micheletti’s decree that suspended human
rights. 31 The Supreme Court holds the authority to apply and enforce laws
under Article 304 of the Honduran Constitution and furthermore, the
Supreme Court has the authority to request the public forces to enforce
rulings as listed in Article 306. 32 For this reason, the Supreme Court
appears to have acted constitutionally when it issued the warrant compelling
the armed forces to remove President Zelaya.
After President Zelaya’s removal, the Honduran Congress followed
proper procedure in presidential succession because the Vice President had
already resigned. 33 Therefore, the removal of President Zelaya from office
and the appointment of his replacement, President Micheletti, seem to be
within constitutional bounds. The first clear constitutional violation
occurred when the military deported President Zelaya from Honduras. This
violated the ban on extraditing Hondurans to foreign states, which is in
Article 102 of the Honduran Constitution. 34 While that action may be
illegal, the powers of constitutional interpretation lie with the Supreme Court
and perhaps, the Legislature. 35 Neither branch would declare that the action
of the military tainted the removal process, and the Supreme Court tried and
acquitted six generals. 36
There are critics that contend that the legislature does not have the right
to interpret the Honduran Constitution and that the forged resignation letter
produced in the legislature is proof of greater wrongdoing by Congress.
However, the Supreme Court has the ability to rule on constitutional issues
and enforce its decisions. Understanding the legal analysis of the situation is
important because it helps uncover the dynamics of the situation. In this
case, the legality of the President’s removal is questionable, but not
flagrantly illegal. Therefore, the U.S. could support the presidential trial, but
only tenuously.
IV. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
Immediately following the removal of President Zelaya, the U.S. needed
to decide if it would support, denounce, or ignore the removal of President
Zelaya. Any course of action must encourage stability and promote
democracy in Latin America with the least political cost to the United States.
Stability and democracy are factors that contribute to peace and consistency
in government and therefore, can encourage future prosperity. To achieve
these goals, the U.S. could have used force to denounce the military’s
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actions, diplomatically denounced the military’s actions, moderately
supported the removal, ignored the situation until the next election, or
supported the reinstatement of Zelaya. There will never be a perfect
solution, but projecting the costs and rewards of possible actions can help
produce the best available policy in any scenario.
One of the boldest moves would have been to use military actions
covertly or openly. This was not a viable option because the history of U.S.
intervention in Latin America has left much to be desired. The covert
actions during the Cold War caused chaos, bloodshed, torture, and damaged
the credibility of the United States in Latin America. 37 Moreover, it would
be illogical to forcibly reinstate a less than democratic leader with anti-U.S.
tendencies. Military intervention would be exceedingly unpopular in U.S.
domestic politics and would promote instability in the region with great
political costs to the U.S. Therefore, this choice was not considered.
The use of policy levers, such as pressure from the international
community, is more efficient and bears less political and financial costs.
With a relatively small investment, trade and aid incentives can also
influence the behavior of sovereign nations. If the U.S. wants to influence
the outcome in Honduras, a measured approach of these moderate policy
tools would be most appropriate. The main issue is whether the U.S. should
apply such pressures, and if so, toward what purpose they should be applied.
It may have been justifiable to use policy tools to back the Honduran
government’s exile of President Zelaya because he was engaging in activity,
the Honduran Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional, to further his
ambitions of a prolonged tenure in office. The government attempted to
follow the proper procedures in addressing President Zelaya’s abuses, but
President Zelaya’s ousting posed the main problem. Layers of decrees
changed the Honduran Constitution and muddled the removal process.
Decrees removed the institutional framework for punishing the misbehavior
of officials and replaced it with vague oversight from the legislature and the
Supreme Court. It can be argued that the removal was constitutional
considering Article 239 says that if an executive official proposes extension
of the presidential term, that act disqualifies the person from presidential
service for ten years. 38
Taking into account the historical context, the support of what many
consider a coup would be a difficult political position to defend because
“many in Latin America saw Mr. Zelaya’s arrest in his pajamas as an
unacceptable throwback to the region’s dark past.” 39 The U.S. has decades
of experience backing military dictators and propping up oppressive leaders
with military aid, but siding with the leaders that ousted a democratically
elected president is typically an antidemocratic act. In the future, the U.S.
may lose credibility when it professes to support democracies because
supporting the removal of a president could encourage other governments to
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remove their presidents instead of working within the normal democratic
processes. In addition, support of President Zelaya’s removal would have
signaled a U.S. tolerance for coups that could embolden those planning
future coups and the U.S. did not want to encourage instability that might
spill over into neighboring countries. The U.S. also benefits from having a
consistent pro-democratic policy because a consistent policy helps to
achieve long-term stability. Unfortunately, there was no clear consensus
about which policy choice was the most pro-democratic and the U.S. could
have incurred great political costs. In addition, supporting President
Zelaya’s removal could have had a destabilizing effect without clear gains
for democracy.
Another possible option would have been for the U.S. to ignore
President Zelaya’s removal and wait for the event to run its course. The next
presidential election was scheduled for November 29, 2009. If no action
takes place, the most likely result would be that citizens would elect a new
president and democracy would resume in the country. This seems to be
what happened. Not reinstating President Zelaya had distinct advantages for
Honduras and the U.S. If President Zelaya remained out of office, he did not
have the opportunity to engage in acts reminiscent of Hugo Chávez that may
have undermined democracy. Reinstating President Zelaya might have
encouraged him and given him the opportunity to increase his power and
entrench his position. This would have had negative consequences for
democracy in Honduras. In addition, his anti-American perspective could
have caused the U.S. more difficulty in foreign relations. Therefore, not
taking a position concerning President Zelaya’s removal might have had
fewer political costs for the United States than taking a stand against his
reinstatement.
Remaining neutral on the issue benefited the current Honduran
government and the U.S. could have used this as a bargaining chip to
encourage constitutional reform. Although, a U.S. push for constitutional
reform may have been problematic and perceived as meddling.
Nevertheless, the constitutional ambiguity leads to problems.
This
ambiguity has been exacerbated by the fact that the use of decrees has
resulted in 130 changes to the Honduran Constitution since 1982. 40 In
addition, much of the Honduran Constitution contains what would be
statutory law in the U.S. because it outlines numerous rights, including labor
and children’s rights. 41 The large number of decrees, altering the Honduran
Constitution, caused the current chaos surrounding President Zelaya’s
removal because one of the decrees altered the impeachment process, which
removed procedural certainty.
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Restoring impeachment proceedings and reducing the number of
decrees that change the Honduran Constitution could have a long-term
benefit by addressing the root cause of the problem. While some flexibility
is necessary, Honduras may benefit from the stability of a constitution that is
harder to change. The unicameral legislature requires a higher vote
threshold to prevent repeated constitutional change because getting one
legislative body to agree is often easier than convincing two legislative
bodies that constitutional change is necessary. A three-fourths vote to pass a
referendum to change the constitution would be harder to achieve than the
two-thirds vote that is currently required under Article 5 of the Honduran
Constitution. 42 .
The U.S. cannot directly control this domestic issue, but it can use
indirect means to suggest changes that may help Honduras, or other
countries in similar circumstances, consolidate its democracy. Incentives
such as not putting pressure on talks to reinstate President Zelaya could
persuade the legislators to consider reform. However, such a large change
may not be possible while the country is under stress and the fix would have
to come from a negotiated political process. In a political arena with many
actors, it would be harder for the U.S. to suggest reforms that the legislature
could implement in a timely manner. In addition, this policy has the least
certain effects because the adoption of reforms will ultimately be out of the
U.S.’s hands, and therefore, the prospect of democracy under this plan
would have been questionable. There also could have been some negative
effects to the region’s stability because other potential coup leaders may
have become emboldened and the U.S. may have lost credibility for
contradicting President Obama’s support for democracy, since because both
sides in Honduras see their cause as democratic.
The initial U.S. policy was to promote the reinstatement of President
Zelaya. One of the first moves by the U.S. State Department was to cutoff
assistance to the Honduran government and define the removal of President
Zelaya as a coup. 43 The U.S. State Department looked to President Arias of
Costa Rica to mediate the dispute within Honduras. 44 The goal was to
restore President Zelaya until the end of his term, and then he would not be
eligible for reelection under the Honduran Constitution. 45 President Arias
warned that the international community would not recognize the November
2009 election if President Zelaya was not restored before the election.
President Arias explains that reinstating President Zelaya, even with limited
powers, will provide “assurance of the continuity of democracy in Latin
America [and that t]he cost of failure of leaving a coup d’état unpunished is
setting up a bad precedent for the region.” 46 When taking Honduras’
militaristic past into account, one can see how restoring the democratically
elected president could foster faith in democracy. Yet, there is a small
chance that if President Zelaya was reinstated he could have commandeered
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the government, and then democracy and stability would have been in a
much worse situation. The Arias Plan tried to prevent this worse case
scenario by restoring President Zelaya with limited powers.
If the U.S. had supported the Arias Plan, it would have shown that the
U.S. had a sincere commitment to the restoration of President Zelaya, and
that the U.S. was not pretending to admonish President Micheletti, while
benefitting from ignoring the situation. The most problematic part of the
Arias Plan is that it recommended not accepting the results of the November
2009 election without reinstating President Zelaya. This would have put
considerable pressure on the Honduran government to reinstate President
Zelaya. The Arias Plan had a potential risk because if negotiations did not
lead to the reinstatement of President Zelaya, the consequences of not
recognizing the election could have led to a longer period of instability.
Over the next presidential term, the democratic process could have lost
legitimacy, even though a fair and free election took place, and therefore this
provision of the plan could have damaged democracy and stability in the
region.
The leaders of Latin America may be better judges of what promotes
stability for their countries. The current Costa Rican President promoted the
return of President Zelaya, and Brazil supported President Zelaya by taking
him in to its embassy. 47 Furthermore, Latin America saw the reinstatement
of President Zelaya as fulfilling its own interests of stability and democracy.
Overall, recommending the reinstatement of President Zelaya would have
had a relatively small political cost to the U.S. because of the support for this
policy from Latin American countries. The countries in the region promoted
reinstatement as the most stable choice because it might have prevented
future coups. There would also have been some democratic gains by
minimizing the role of the military in civilian government operations, even if
it is at the bequest of the Supreme Court.
V. CONCLUSION
After exploring the various policy options, it is clear that if the U.S. had
supported the removal of the Honduran President, it would have been
politically costly, may have had negative effects on democracy in Latin
America, and may have reduced stability in the region by encouraging future
coups. Remaining neutral to the situation would have cost the U.S. political
credibility, and have the same ill effects on stability and democracy as
supporting the removal of the president. Supporting the reinstatement of
President Zelaya could have moderate gains for democracy, increased
regional stability by discouraging coups, and had the least political costs.
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Yet, the Arias Plan did the entail risk that may have resulted in the worst
possible scenario, the unlawful seizure of the government by President
Zelaya, especially if concrete limits were not placed on President Zelaya.
Out of these possible options, the U.S. chose not to recognize the
removal of the President Zelaya, in order to deter future coup leaders.
However, after the election, the U.S. recognized the new democratically
elected president. The U.S. made the right choice supporting the Arias Plan
with the proviso that if the elections were free and fair the U.S. would
recognize their results. This policy has avoided the long-term risks of the
Arias Plan and it has the greatest potential to produce the most gains for
regional democracy and stability with tolerable political costs to the U.S. In
addition, the recognition of free and fair elections makes sense and sends a
consistent pro-democratic message.
While the U.S. may have taken the most attractive option, there are still
serious implications. Opposition candidate, Porfirio Lobo, won the election
on November 27, 2009 and the U.S. supported the results in an effort to
promote national reconciliation. 48 But, not all states are recognizing the
election as legitimate, and some countries, such as Brazil, are considering
this move tantamount to supporting the coup. 49 In addition, Freedom House
has relegated Honduras’s status and no longer classifies Honduras as an
electoral democracy. 50 As a result the U.S. has suffered moderate political
backlash. Although these political costs have been mitigated since other
Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Peru and Costa Rica, have
decided to accept the election results. 51
The institutions in Honduras have survived and it may be possible to
repair the damage to democracy caused by the removal of Zelaya. The Lobo
administration has a significant challenge ahead. Honduras must act with
clearly defined and democratic actions to regain international legitimacy.
The best way to accomplish this is for the executive, legislature, and the
people to reexamine their constitution. Much could be gained from
clarifying the duties of the different branches of government, the
enforcement powers, and most importantly, the constitutional procedures.
The goal of the U.S. foreign policy towards Honduras, and other Latin
American countries, should be to foster democracy and stability while
avoiding political costs that would erode the U.S.’s soft power in the region.
The U.S. made the right choice in Honduras by trying to reconcile factions,
while ultimately showing support for the result of the next election. Military
actions would be counterproductive in almost any Latin American country
because of the region’s history with military oppression. The United States
must demonstrate strong support to democracy to assist in Latin America’s
struggle to overcome history. Ultimately, the instability in Honduras sets a
precedent that shows the most beneficial U.S. response to questions of
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democratic legitimacy in Latin American countries is the consistent
recognition of free and fair elections.
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